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Organic and Kosher Foods: A Tale of Two Certification Systems 
 
Abstract 
Food products may be labeled with respect not only to their ingredients 
and nutritional content, but also to their adherence to various ethical or 
religious process-based standards.  Because consumers view these claims 
as desirable, both private organizations and government have sought to 
ensure that the claims are accurate and meaningful.  However, this has 
been accomplished in very different ways with respect to two particular 
labels: organic and kosher.  Organic food producers are governed by a 
federal regulatory regime that imposes a minimum standard for organic 
processes and a maximum with respect to what claims may be made, 
increasing standardization and consumer education but decreasing 
consumer choice and effective enforcement.  Kosher producers, in 
contrast, contract with private certification organizations with individual 
standards and state regulation occurs only with respect to fraud; the effects 
are opposite.  Choosing which regime to apply to future process-based 
claims requires an analysis of the claim’s potential consumer base.   
 
 
Introduction   
 “Organic” food means many things to many people, but it generally signifies that 
the food has been produced eschewing synthetic or chemical assistance in most or all of 
its stages; this requires that components like fertilizer, additives, and feed for livestock be 
similarly free of non-natural products.  Over the past several decades, the move toward 
organically produced food has picked up tremendous speed.  Organic food sales 
accounted for 3.5% of all food sales in the United States by the end of 2008, a $22.9 
billion market.
1  Moreover, the organic sector in general experienced growth of 17.1% in 
the last year,
2 a rate consistent with those seen over the past decade.
3  Over two-thirds of 
adult American consumers buy organic products at least occasionally, for reasons ranging 
from pesticide avoidance to taste to support for environmentally friendly agriculture.
4  
                                                 
1 Press Release, Organic Trade Association, U.S. Organic Sales Grow by a Whopping 
17.1 Percent in 2008 (May 4, 2009), available at http://www.organicnewsroom.com/ 
2009/05/us_organic_sales_grow_by_a_who.html.  
2 Id. 
3 See Ching Lee, California Farm Bureau Federation, Growth in Organic Food Sales 
Continues, at Slower Pace (Mar. 18, 2009), available at http://www.cfbf.com/agalert/ 
AgAlertStory.cfm?ID=1257&ck=CD758E8F59DFDF06A852ADAD277986CA.   
4 Organic Trade Association, Consumer Profile Facts, http://www.ota.com/organic/mt/ 
consumer.html (last visited May 13, 2009).     2 
With the rise in consumer interest has come an increase in regulation; pursuant to a 1989 
federal law, the United States Department of Agriculture developed and implemented an 
extensive set of standards that are mandated for nearly all sizeable organic food 
producers and manufacturers.  Although this certainly increased both regularization and 
ease of use, it has left the agency open both to charges of watering down the standards 
and to arguments that new types of labeling should be created to protect other 
characteristics that consumers have come to care about.   
There is, however, an alternative model for standardization and certification of 
process-based label claims: the system used to regulate kosher food.  Market research 
reports suggest that sales of kosher-certified food topped $200 billion in 2008 and show 
an enormous rate of growth.
5  Yet, all kosher certification — outside inspection to ensure 
that the product is what it claims to be — is performed by various private entities.  The 
food packaging is then labeled with distinctive markers representing both the certification 
and the entity responsible for it.  Consumers may choose foods certified only by agencies 
that have certifications meeting their standards.   
This paper will seek to explore the history of both certification models, the 
advantages and disadvantages of each, and what we as both consumers and regulators 
might learn from the workings of the two processes.   
 
Organic Food Production and Historical Regulation 
  The organic farming movement is not simply a remnant of peasant farming 
practices, but rather a relatively new agricultural development dating from the 1920s 
work of several European scholars and activists.  Sir Albert Howard and Robert 
McCarrison performed experiments in India suggesting for the first time that there was a 
                                                 
5 LISA SCHINHOFEN, MARKET TREND: KOSHER- AND HALAL-CERTIFIED FOODS IN THE 
U.S., SUMMARY (2009), available at http://www.reportlinker.com/p0119235/ 
MarketTrend-Kosher--and-Halal-Certified-Foods-in-the-US.html.  Many kosher-certified 
products are purchased by consumers uninterested in the kosher designation; products 
purchased explicitly because they were kosher-certified constituted a market somewhere 
between $14 billion and $17 billion.  Id.     3 
relationship between soil health and plant resistance to disease and pests, as well as 
between soil health and the health of individuals whose diet was composed of plants from 
that soil.
6  The Austrian philosopher, scientist, and educator Rudolph Steiner founded the 
field of “biodynamic agriculture,” a method of organic farming that incorporated assorted 
spiritual and mystical beliefs.
7  The theories of these men, as well as those of Lady Eve 
Balfour in the United Kingdom, were brought to a wider audience by Organic Gardening 
and Farming, a United States magazine founded by J.I. Rodale in the 1940s.
8  The birth 
of modern environmentalism and pesticide awareness. following the publication of 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, brought further popularity to the proposal to move away 
from industrialized farming methods.
9  By the early 1970s, a full-fledged organic farming 
movement had begun, dedicated not only to providing pesticide-free food but to such 
larger goals as creating an alternative to the entire conventional food supply chain.
10   
  With the advent of organic farmers came regulation of what was considered 
“organic.”  Presuming that food safety and regulation was the province of the states, 
Oregon led the way with an organic foods labeling law in 1973.
11  It required that organic 
agricultural products be grown in fields untouched by chemical fertilizers or herbicides 
for 24 months, barred drugs and hormones for organic livestock,
12 and allowed the term 
                                                 
6 Kate L. Harrison, Organic Plus: Regulating Beyond the Current Organic Standards, 25 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 211, 213–14 (2008).    
7 Paul Kristiansen & Charles Merfield, Overview of Organic Agriculture, in ORGANIC 
AGRICULTURE: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 4 (Paul Kristiansen, Acram Taji & John 
Reganold eds., 2006).  Those who practice biodynamics utilize somewhat eccentric 
farming techniques — including burying powdered quartz inside a cow horn for six 
months, digging it up, and then using it in homeopathic quantities as a foliar spray to 
stimulate growth.  Despite their apparent strangeness, however, research has shown that 
biodynamic compost preparations affect compost and the composting process positively.  
STEVE DIVER, ATTRA-NATIONAL SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE INFORMATION SERVICE, 
BIODYNAMIC FARMING & COMPOST PREPARATION 3, 5 (1999), available at http://attra. 
ncat.org/attra-pub/PDF/biodynam.pdf.   
8 Harrison, supra note 6, at 214; Kristiansen & Merfield, supra note 7, at 5; Michael 
Pollan, Naturally, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 30.   
9 Harrison, supra note 6, at 214; Kristiansen & Merfield, supra note 7, at 6.   
10 See Pollan, supra note 7.   
11 Gordon G. Bones, State and Federal Organic Food Certification Laws: Coming of 
Age?, 68 N.D. L. REV. 405, 410 (1992).   
12 OR. REV. STAT. § 616.406 (1989).    4 
“organic” to be used on labels only on products without pesticide residue in excess of ten 
percent of the federal Environmental Protection Agency tolerance levels.
13  California 
followed with a similar program in 1979, using the Oregon model but adding features 
like public disclosure of farming methods, mandatory package labeling that quoted the 
relevant standards from the Code, and a definition of “synthetic.”
14  Moreover, private 
entities began to develop programs to certify organic food products and avoid fraud.  
California Certified Organic Farmers, founded in 1973, predated California’s state 
regulations and served as the nation’s first third-party organic certification entity.
15  
Finally, there were international components to the regulation of organics.  IFOAM, a 
multinational non-governmental organization dedicated to promoting organic agriculture 
and propagating organic standards, sprung from a French farmers’ association in 1972.  
By 1975 it would have fifty member organizations from seventeen countries.
16  Five 
years later, IFOAM published its “Basic Standards,” guided by seven major principles:  
To work as much as possible within a closed system, and draw upon local 
resources. 
To maintain the long-term fertility of soils. 
To avoid all forms of pollution that may result from agricultural 
techniques. 
To produce foodstuffs of high nutritional quality and sufficient quantity. 
To reduce the use of fossil energy in agricultural practice to a minimum. 
To give livestock conditions of life that conform to their physiological 
needs and to humanitarian principles. 
To make it possible for agricultural producers to earn a living through 
their work and develop their potentialities as human beings.
17   
 
Regulation increased gradually from all of these sources throughout the 1980s.   
Organic food took a rapid jump into the mainstream in 1989, when the television 
show 60 Minutes did an exposé on the use of the chemical daminozide, commonly known 
                                                 
13 Id. § 616.416 (1989).   
14 Bones, supra note 11, at 410 & n.26; see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 26569.13 
(1979) (repealed 1990).   
15 CATHY GREENE, ECON. RESEARCH SERV., ORGANIC LABELING 27, available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer793/aer793g.pdf.   
16 Bernward Geier, Int’l Fed’n Organic Agric. Movements, A Look at the Development 
of IFOAM in Its First 25 Years, at 1, http://www.ifoam.org/about_ifoam/inside_ifoam/ 
pdfs/First_25_Years.pdf.   
17 1980 IFOAM Principles, quoted in Kristiansen & Merfield, supra note 7, at 13 tbl. 1.5.     5 
by the brandname Alar, in apple farming to improve the appearance of the fruit and keep 
it on the tree longer.
18  The Natural Resources Defense Council and other public interest 
groups stated on the show that Alar degraded into a carcinogen and remained in the flesh 
of apples regardless of washing, peeling, or processing.
19  Growers of red apples 
experienced a sharp decline in both prices and sales, with millions of dollars sustained in 
losses.
20  Demand for organic products produced without these carcinogens, on the other 
hand, soared.
21  Polls taken in 1989 indicated that eighty-four percent of American 
consumers were interested in purchasing organic produce and that half of those were 
willing to pay a premium for such products.
22  By 1990, twenty-two states would have 
some form of organic regulation.
23  Of these, Washington, Texas, and Colorado had 
certification programs run directly by the state government; four other states had 
programs whereby the state government cooperated closely with third-party certifiers, 
and the remaining fifteen merely promulgated labeling statutes and regulations, leaving 
third-party certification associations to handle all inspection and certification.
24   
 
Modern Organic Regulation 
As a result of the growth in both demand and state regulation, consumers, organic 
farmers, and industry groups began to lobby for national regulation of organic food.  
Organic production standards were different in minor but significant ways in each state, 
making interstate commerce difficult: the feed for cows producing organic milk, for 
example, was required to be exclusively organic in New Hampshire, unmedicated in 
Kansas, and varying by time period in California.
25  Moreover, international export of 
organic food was problematic, as state standards did not necessarily correspond to 
                                                 
18 Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes,” 800 F. Supp. 928, 930 (E.D. Wash. 1992).   
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 930–31.   
21 See Pollan, supra note 7. 
22 See S. REP. NO. 101-357 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 4943.   
23 Harrison, supra note 6, at 215.   
24 Bones, supra note 11, at 408.   
25 S. REP. NO. 101-357, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4943.     6 
national standards in other countries or to the IFOAM guidelines.
26  These concerns were 
particularly relevant to the large agribusinesses that had gotten into organic farming as a 
result of the Alar scandal demand;
27 they and their interest groups led the lobbying of 
Congress to establish national organic standards.
28  In response, Congress passed the 
Organic Foods Production Act of 1990
29 (OFPA), seeking to give “growers and 
consumers . . . a clear picture of just what organically grown really means.”
30  The Act 
claimed as its purposes “(1) to establish national standards governing the marketing of 
certain agricultural products are organically produced products; (2) to assure consumers 
that organically produced products meet a certain standard; and (3) to facilitate interstate 
commerce in fresh and processed food that is organically produced.”
31    
  OFPA required the Secretary of Agriculture to develop an organic certification 
program for “producers and handlers of agricultural products that have been produced 
using organic methods,”
32 which would be implemented through certifying agents.
33  This 
use of third-party certifiers was designed to “take advantage of the network of private 
organic certification organizations that exist in nearly every State,” as both industry 
groups and states suggested would be efficient.
34  Each state would also be permitted to 
                                                 
26 Id. at 4944.   
27 Heinz, Gerber’s, ConAgra, and Dole were among the large mainstream food companies 
that acquired or developed organic brands during the years immediately following Alar. 
Pollan, supra note 7.   
28 Benjamin N. Gutman, Ethical Eating: Applying the Kosher Food Regulatory Regime to 
Organic Food, 108 YALE L.J. 2351, 2371 & n.159 (1999).  The United Fresh Fruit and 
Vegetable Association and American Farm Bureau Federation both sought national 
regulation, allegedly to preserve a market niche in organic produce for mainstream 
farmers.  S. REP. NO. 101-357, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4944; Gutman, 
supra, at 2371 n.159.   
29 Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, § 2101–03, 104 Stat. 
3935–51 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6501–22).   
30 Gutman, supra note 28, at 2371 (quoting 136 CONG. REC. 3078 (1990) (statement of 
Rep. DeFazio) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
31 § 2102, 104 Stat. at 3935.   
32 Id. § 2104(a).   
33 Id. § 2104(d).   
34 S. REP. NO. 101-357 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 4948.  The 
legislation allowed certifiers to be state entities as well as private organizations, as some 
state departments of agriculture indicated that they would prefer to handle certification 
themselves.  Id.   7 
implement an state organic program, which could be more restrictive in its requirements 
governing certification and production of organically labeled products than the federal 
requirements, as long as it did not result in discrimination toward out-of-state organic 
products and made no claims of superior quality on the labeling.
35  The actual definition 
of “organic” and related terms was left mostly up to further agency regulation, regulation 
to be made in conjunction with a National Organic Standards Board composed of 
representatives from various agricultural constituencies.
36  OFPA itself required only that, 
with few exceptions, synthetics not be added to organic products, that organic products 
(excluding agriculture) be produced on soil to which no synthetics or other prohibited 
substances had been applied in the three preceding years, and that producers and handlers 
of organic products have an “organic plan” reviewed by the certifying agent and 
specifying farm management practices that forward appropriate organic goals.
37   
  The Department of Agriculture (USDA) did not produce proposed regulations 
under OFPA until late 1997.
38  While the regulations were mostly uncontroversial in their 
provisions,
39 the agency did request comments on certain potential agricultural additives 
that were surprising and alarming to many organic proponents: genetically engineered 
substances, irradiation, and sewage sludge.
40  In addition, the regulations expanded 
                                                 
35 §§ 2104(b), 2108, 104 Stat. at 3939–40; S. REP. NO. 101-357, as reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4949.  States that created a state organic program would be required to 
take on enforcement duties for both national and state regulations.  National Organic 
Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,548, 80,596 (Dec. 21, 2000).   
36 §§ 2104(c), 2119, 104 Stat. at 3939, 3947–49.  The Board was required to include four 
organic farmers, two organic handlers, one organic retailer, three environmental 
protection experts, three public interest representatives, two toxicology, ecology, or 
biochemistry experts, and one certifying agent.  Id. § 2119.   
37 Id. §§ 2105, 2114.   
38 National Organic Program, 62 Fed. Reg. 65,850 (Dec. 16, 1997).   
39 See, e.g., Consumers Union, Comments on Docket No. TMD-94-00-2, National 
Organic Program, Apr. 10, 1998, available at  http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/ 
core_food_safety/002315.html (“[W]e believe the NOSB process preceding the proposed 
rule was sound, adhered closely to the letter and spirit of the law, was conducted with 
great thoughtfulness, attention to detail and sound science, and involved the required 
constituencies.”).  But see Pollan, supra note 7 (calling the standards “watery” and 
“oblig[ing to] agribusiness clients”).   
40 62 Fed. Reg. at 65,875 (genetically engineered organisms), 65,884 (ionizing radiation), 
65,892–93 (municipal sludge).     8 
allowed synthetic additives, both active and inert, to include compounds not approved by 
the Board — in violation of OFPA’s requirement that synthetics be Board reviewed and 
approved.
41  In total, the agency received over 275,000 comments on the proposed rule, 
the largest number in USDA history.
42   Those comments were nearly unanimous in their 
opposition to genetic engineering, irradiation, and sludge.
43  Driven to revisit the 
regulations by this outburst of public opinion, the agency did not return with a new 
proposal until 2000.  The revised proposal barred all three controversial methods,
44 and 
the new regulations took effect on October 21, 2002.
45 
  The final regulations, which were lengthy and detailed, established the National 
Organic Program (NOP). They included provisions governing certification, labeling 
(determined by organic percentage of the product), the accreditation of certifying agents, 
the creation and modification of the National List (which controls which synthetic items 
may be added to organic products), and pesticide residue testing.
46   
The regulations set forth four categories of products encompassing all levels of 
organic ingredients.  A product composed entirely of organic ingredients may label itself 
as “100% organic.”
47  Products that are between 95% and 100% organic (calculated either 
by weight or fluid volume of the ingredients) may bear the label “organic,” and, if the 
manufacturer so desires, the appropriate percentage.  They must also indicate which of 
their ingredients are organic.
48  Both 100% organic products and organic products may 
bear the USDA seal, a circular green, brown, and white logo with the text “USDA 
                                                 
41 Consumers Union, supra note 39.   
42 National Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 13512, 13512 (Mar. 13, 2000).   
43 Id. at 13513–15.   
44 Id. 
45 Harrison, supra note 6, at 220.   
46 See National Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,548, 80,637–63 (Dec. 21, 2000) 
(codified at 7 C.F.R. § 205 et seq).  For a detailed analysis of the final regulations, see 
Jessica Ellsworth, The History of Organic Food Regulation, Winter 2001, available at 
http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/383/Ellsworth.pdf.   
47 65 Fed. Reg. at 80,578–79.   
48 Id.   9 
Organic.”
49  Products that are between 70% and 95% organic may only state on their 
packaging that they are “made with organic ingredients” and may not carry the USDA 
seal.
50  Finally, products that wish to make an organic claim but contain less than 70% 
organic content may only provide the relevant percentage and identify which ingredients 
are organic; they also may not be labeled with the USDA seal.
51   
Certifying agents, both state and private, must be accredited; each accreditation 
lasts for five years but annual review by staff or outside auditor is required.
52  Accredited 
certifiers must have “sufficient expertise in organic production or handling techniques” to 
properly implement NOP as designed, including using sufficient properly trained 
personnel.
53  Moreover, they must avoid conflicts of interest by not providing advice or 
consulting services to applicants.
54  Although states were able to require compliance with 
their more restrictive standards as a condition of certification by any certifier, 
governmental or private, within that state (presuming that the standards complied with 
the OFPA non-discrimination and consistency requirements as described above), no 
individual certifying agent was permitted to institute a more stringent certification 
regime.
55   
 
Recent Organic Controversies 
                                                 
49 Id.; National Organic Program, The Organic Seal, http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ 
ams.fetchTemplateData.do?&template=TemplateC&navID=NationalOrganicProgram&le
ftNav=NationalOrganicProgram&page=NOPOrganicSeal&description=The%20Organic
%20Seal&acct=nopgeninfo (last visited May 13, 2009).   
50 65 Fed. Reg. at 80,579.  
51 65 Fed. Reg. at 80,579–80.   
52 7 C.F.R. § 205.500–.501 (2008).   
53 Id. § 205.501(a).   
54 Id. § 205.501(a)(11).   
55 Id. § 205.501(b); 65 Fed. Reg. at 80,603.  Numerous commenters had requested this 
ability in order to “raise the bar” with respect to ecological or social goals not addressed 
in the regulations.  Nonetheless, the USDA believed that such a provision would be 
“inconsistent with . . . a stated purpose of the [OFPA,] to assure consumers that 
organically produced products meet a consistent national standard.”  65 Fed. Reg. at 
80,607.  Although accredited certifying agents are able to establish other standards than 
those of the NOP, they may not be referred to as organic standards, nor may the 
certifier’s mark be withheld from producers who do not meet those optional standards.  
See id. at 80,608.     10 
Despite the thoroughness of the federal organic program and the extensive time 
spent in its development, consumers,  advocates, and the regulated entities themselves 
have still found much to complain about in the intervening years.  One controversy arose 
as a result of Congressional interference with organic standards via amendment to OFPA.  
The spending bill passed by Congress in February 2003 contained a provision, inserted in 
a closed-door session the night before the bill was passed, that allowed livestock labeled 
organic to be fed on conventionally grown feed unless the Secretary of Agriculture 
certified that organic feed was available at less than twice the price of conventional.
56  
The provision was added at the behest of Representative Nathan Deal of Georgia and 
prompted by the lobbying of a single Georgia poultry farm that wished to be allowed to 
feed its chickens a mixture of organic and conventional feed.
57  Representative Deal had 
received $4000 in contributions from the farm in question during his prior campaign.
58  
The provision was repealed mere months later amidst outcry from the public and other 
legislators.
59  
  Other controversies have resulted from regulation at the agency level.  For 
instance, Arthur Harvey, a producer and handler of organic blueberries, sued the USDA 
in 2003 for promulgating in violation of the OFPA a variety of regulations, including a 
provision exempting non-organic products not commercially available in organic form 
from the standard National List review procedures, a provision permitting the use of 
synthetic ingredients in processing, and a provision allowing dairy animals being 
converted to organic production to be fed 80% organic feed in the year prior to sale of 
                                                 
56 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7 § 771, 117 Stat. 
11, 49; Marian Burros, Late Addition to Spending Bill Would Dilute Organic Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, at A24.   
57 Burros, supra note 56.   
58 Id. 
59 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-11 § 
2104, 117 Stat. 559, 589; see also Jean M. Rawson, Organic Agriculture in the U.S.: 
Program and Policy Issues, in ORGANIC AGRICULTURE IN THE U.S. 1, 8 (Alison J. 
Wellstone ed., 2007).  Senator Patrick Leahy, one of the original proponents of OFPA, 
had attempted to remove the Deal provision even before it was passed, and had put forth 
in the Senate by late February the somewhat hyperbolically named Organic Restoration 
Act of 2003.  Organic Restoration Act of 2003, S. 457, 108th Cong. (2003).     11 
their products as organic.
60  The First Circuit found in Harvey’s favor with respect to the 
second two provisions in 2005.
61  The response from organic stakeholders was mixed; 
consumer groups and some food retailers welcomed the imminent tightening of the 
regulations, while larger manufacturers worried that their products would have to be 
removed from shelves or would no longer be eligible to bear the organic designation.
62  
To address the industry concerns, Congress chose to amend OFPA in a way that provided 
statutory support for the contested provisions and mooted the First Circuit’s order.
63  The 
amendments permitted the use of synthetic ingredients as long as they were appropriately 
placed on the National List
64 and provided a statutory basis for the dairy feed 
regulations.
65  Unsurprisingly, the USDA chose not to further revise the regulations to 
comply with the court’s original order on synthetics; a district court affirmed this 
decision as appropriate in 2006.
66    
  Consumer groups have also complained about the USDA’s failure to properly 
enforce its regulations.  Over a period of two years, Cornucopia, a Wisconsin farm policy 
group, filed formal complaints with the agency about Aurora Organic Dairy, a large 
organic “factory-farm” operation.  Cornucopia alleged that Aurora was not allowing 
animals to graze on pasture as required and was inappropriately using conventional 
animals as replacements for organic ones in its dairy herd, selling the resultant non-
                                                 
60 Harvey v. Veneman, 396 F.3d 28, 32–33 (1st Cir. 2005).   
61 Id. at 45–46.  With respect to the first provision mentioned, the court found that the 
regulation was permissible as long as it was construed narrowly to require individualized 
review of the non-organic products, and instructed the district court to enter a declaratory 
judgment accordingly.  Id. at 35–36, 45.   
62 Rawson, supra note 59, at 12.   
63 Harvey v. Johanns, 462 F. Supp. 2d 69, 74 (D. Me. 2006); Jocelyn Rita Rood, How the 
Organic Program Came to Be, Current Debates, and Future Application to other 
“Natural” Food Terms, April 2007, available at http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/838/ 
Rood_07_[redacted].html; see also Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug 
Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-97, 
119 Stat. 2120 (2005).     
64 Harvey, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 72 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 6510).   
65 Rood, supra note 63.     
66 See Harvey. 462 F. Supp. 2d at 70–71.     12 
organic milk as organic.
67  During that time, the USDA took no responsive action.  
Finally, in 2007, Cornucopia indicated that it intended to sue the agency for failure to 
investigate complaints and to enforce the regulations, as well as for ignoring 
recommendations made by the National Organic Standards Board for remedying these 
types of violations.
68  This spurred the USDA to send Aurora a “Notice of Proposed 
Revocation,” noting that it had found multiple, willful violations of the regulation.  At 
this point, rather than proceed through the standard NOP enforcement process, which 
might have required revocation or suspension of certification and the imposition of 
significant fines, the agency and Aurora came to a deal: Aurora would stop its violations 
within a given time period and in return would keep its certification.
69  NOP argued that 
this was the most expeditious way of resolving the conflict; litigation would have taken 
considerably longer and the violations might not have been corrected for years.
70  
Evidence obtained by Cornucopia suggested that the enforcement action had been the 
subject of political maneuvering by Aurora for as long as eighteen months prior to the 
final decision.
71     
  Even today, battles rage on over appropriate certification and labeling standards.  
The American Farmers for the Advancement and Conservation of Technology group is 
seeking to have states ban labeling with absentee claims like “pesticide free” on the 
grounds that such labels mislead consumers and has obtained a ban in Ohio on providing 
                                                 
67 A. Christine Green, The Cost of Low-Price Organics: How Corporate Organics Have 
Weakened Organic Food Production Standards, 59 ALA. L. REV. 799, 822–23 (2008); 
Press Release, Mark Kastel, The Cornucopia Institute, Cornucopia Update on USDA 
Crack Down on Aurora Dairy’s Factory Feedlots & Certifier Complicity (Aug. 31, 2007), 
available at http://www.organicconsumers.org/articles/article_6912.cfm.   
68 Green, supra note 67, at 823.   
69 Id. at 823–24.   
70 See id. at 824.  NOP has a stated enforcement policy of trying to “address . . . violations 
as quickly as possible so consumers are not victims of fraud.”  Enforcement & Integrity 
of the National Organic Program: Q&A’s for Consumers, http://www.ams.usda.gov/ 
AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRD3106940 (last visited May 13, 2009).  The 
program encourages the filing of complaints but provides no information about ongoing 
investigations in order to protect businesses from unwarranted harm and to avoid 
hampering the investigation.  See id.  
71 Green, supra note 67, at 825–26; Press Release, Kastel, supra note 67.     13 
milk labels with information about synthetic growth hormone use; it is opposed by the 
Organic Trade Association and other organic advocacy groups.
72  The Organic 
Consumers Association is leading a boycott of organic milk that comes from cows kept 
on factory farm feedlots rather than allowed to graze on pasture.
73  The salmonella 
outbreak from peanuts processed in a certified organic facility in February 2009 spurred 
the USDA to issue a directive to all certifiers to take into account potential health 
violations when performing inspections, and to report those violations to health and 
safety agencies.
74  Nonetheless, some certifiers noted that food safety was not a true part 
of their brief under the federal standards, and even the directive itself acknowledged that 
“NOP is not a health and safety program.”
75   
  Finally, even the valuation of the “organic” label by some of organic food’s core 
constituency is beginning to decline.  With the growing concern in environmentalist 
circles over the contribution of carbon emissions to global warming, for example, many 
food advocates are suggesting that locally grown produce may be environmentally 
superior to organic produce that has to be internationally imported.
76  So-called 
“locavores” seek to eat foods that come from as close to their homes as possible (some 
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even restrict themselves to a 100-mile radius for all food consumption), including organic 
and sustainable principles as a part but not the whole of their food consumption criteria.
77   
  Many of the debates over organic regulation are as much about the philosophy of 
organic agriculture as they are about statutory interpretation or consumer confusion.  
Consumers and farmers concerned about the addition of synthetic ingredients during 
processing have a different take on what it may mean to be organic from those who 
would rather focus only on the environmental impact of the agricultural process; those 
who want organic food to be safer and healthier may not be concerned about access to 
pasture for dairy animals as long as no synthetic growth hormones or antibiotics are used 
in treating the livestock.  And those who buy into some of the original values of organic 
agriculture — small farms, sustainable methodologies, and freedom from industrial 
supply chains — may be profoundly disappointed by the current set of organic standards.  
The intersection of interest group politics and lobbying with these philosophical 
constructs has produced continual concern over both whether organic standards are being 
appropriately accommodating to a variety of farmers nationwide and whether the 
standards are being watered down and becoming meaningless.  One set of organic 
standards is having a great deal of difficulty in fitting all.   
 
Kosher Law and Practice 
  The Jewish tradition of kashrut, or kosher law, is a system of religious teachings 
and beliefs that governs both the types of food and the preparation of food that observant 
Jews may eat.  The laws followed are extensive and complex, derived from a variety of 
biblical verses and rabbinical writings both ancient and modern.
78  One of the most 
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influential codifications of kosher law, for example, is contained in the Shulchan Aruch 
(“the prepared table”), a sixteenth-century text by Rabbi Yosef Karo; yet modern food 
technology requires constant contemporary rabbinic interpretation and analysis, such that 
Israel has two chief rabbis whose position is to pronounce on new issues.
79  There are two 
major strains of kashrut based on ethnicity: Ashkenazi Jews, whose ancestors come from 
Europe, have different customs from Sephardic Jews, whose ancestors come from areas 
around the Mediterranean.
80  American customs are usually based on those of the 
Ashkenazim.   
  The basic laws of kashrut can be broken into two categories: product rules and 
process rules.
81  Product rules are categorical bars on certain types of food and approvals 
for other types.  All fresh fruits and vegetables, for example, are categorically kosher.
82  
On the other hand, many types of animals are forbidden as food.  Of mammals, only 
those that have split hooves and chew their cud may be eaten;
 83 all others are not kosher.  
Fish must have fins and scales to be kosher, hence shellfish are prohibited.
84   
In contrast, process rules govern the ways in which food may be prepared and 
eaten.  Even animals that are not categorically barred must be slaughtered in a particular 
way: the animal’s trachea, esophagus, carotid arteries, and jugular veins must be slit in a 
continuous slice with a particularly sharp knife free of imperfections.
85  An individual 
who performs this slaughter (called a “shochet”) must have years of training and 
particular authorization because the ritual is so complex.
86  After the slaughter, the 
animal’s lungs are inspected for lesions; different Jewish traditions have varying rules 
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about how many and what types of lesions may disqualify the animal.
87    Finally, some 
parts of the animal are prohibited and must be removed, including the blood, some types 
of fat, and the sciatic nerve.  In order to remove the blood, the meat is generally salted 
and soaked.
88   Another process rule is that forbidding the consumption of milk and meat 
(as well as any of their derivatives) together.
89  Any inadvertent combination of these 
products may render the whole non-kosher.  Moreover, the utensils and equipment used 
to prepare one type of food may not generally be used to prepare the other type without 
ritual cleansing.
90   
Finally, there is an entirely separate set of kosher standards that come into play on 
the holiday of Passover, when leavening must be avoided.  Wheat, rye, oats, barley, and 
spelt — or any of their derivatives — are prohibited unless they are made into 
unleavened bread called matzah.
91  Other types of food are precluded depending on ethnic 
custom: Ashkenazi Jews are prohibited from eating quasi-grains and legumes like corn, 
beans, soy, rice, lentils, and peanuts.
92   
The potential variation in the kosher practice of individuals is, unsurprisingly, 
enormous.  As discussed above, Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews have varying traditions 
on points like the status of legumes during Passover and the acceptability of lesions in the 
lungs of slaughtered animals.  Moreover, Orthodox Judaism and Conservative Judaism, 
both of which promote following the laws of kashrut, differ on the degree to which non-
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Jews may be involved in cooking and handling wine, among other doctrinal issues.
93  
Some segment of the observant population insists on following standards generally 
regarded as preferred but not required; kosher food produced to meet this level of 
stringency generally requires full-time rabbinic supervision and cannot come into contact 
with equipment that requires ritual cleansing.
94  Besides these doctrinal disputes, many 
Jews, particularly those who identify as members of Reform or Conservative traditions, 
observe the laws of kashrut to an individualized extent based on personal preference.  
Some who cheerfully consume bacon cheeseburgers nonetheless observe the strictures of 
Passover; some who regularly avoid mixing milk and meat will nonetheless eat shellfish 
and vice versa. 
 
The Kosher Certification and Regulation System 
Kosher food is certified as such by any one of hundreds of private certifiers, with 
reaches that range from the local to the international.
95  Some certifiers are specialized 
organizations, both for-profit and non-profit; some are communal entities responsible for 
general Jewish needs that perform local kosher certification as a portion of their portfolio, 
and some are private individuals.
96  The largest private certifier, Orthodox Union Kosher, 
supervises more than 500,000 products in 80 countries;
97 in fact, over 60% of kosher-
certified products in the United States are certified by Orthodox Union.
98  Each certifier 
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places its trademark symbol on the packaging of products under its supervision; Orthodox 
Union’s symbol is the familiar U inside a circle.
99  The certifiers go to great lengths to 
protect these certification marks, as misuse is not only a trademark infringement but can 
lead to the consumption of non-kosher food by the observant.
100  Some manufacturers 
may put simply the letter “k” on their packaging.  Because letters of the alphabet may not 
be trademarked, the “k” standing alone is a representation by the manufacturer alone that 
the food is kosher; it is not necessarily backed by any certifying agency.
101  Many 
observant consumers, unsurprisingly, will not accept “k”-marked foods as kosher.   
Certification procedures vary by organization, site, and type of food produced, but 
generally begin with an initial inspection to reveal any issues with manufacturing or 
production that would pose a barrier to certification.   A thorough ingredient and records 
examination occurs as well.
102  To officially institute the certification, elaborate contracts 
are drawn up between the certifier and the manufacturer specifying, among other terms, 
which products are to be certified, the ingredients that may be used in their production, 
and the process and equipment agreed upon and approved.
103  Finally, the manufacturing 
facility will be subject to regular inspections throughout the certification period of all 
operations related to the manufacturing process, as well as a review of ingredients, 
records, and labels.
104  
Because kosher products often command a premium in price, concerns about 
fraud and dilution of standards have existed for hundreds of years.  As early as 1796, a 
Christian butcher in New York City attempted to fraudulently purvey his meat as kosher 
by labeling it with the symbol of the shochet.  The New York Council of the time 
                                                 
99 LEVENSON, supra note 82, at 189.   
100 See, e.g., Tracking Down OU Imposters, supra note 98.   
101 LEVENSON, supra note 82, at 190.  Companies may choose to use a “k” rather than a 
certifying agency mark even if a certifier is involved in order to maintain the flexibility to 
switch certifiers without redesigning packaging.  Id. 
102 BLECH, supra note 78, at 12–13.   
103 Id. at 14–15.   
104 Id. at 1–2.  Certain types of food, like meat, wine, and cheese, require full-time 
supervision by rabbinic inspectors; the periodic inspection process described above is 
more common. Id. at 2–5.       19 
suspended his butcher’s license in response.
105  Nearly 150 years later, New York State, 
which had a growing population of recent Jewish immigrants, would pass America’s first 
kosher fraud law.  It stated that “[a] person, who, with intent to defraud . . . [s]ells or 
exposes for sale any meat or meat preparation and falsely represents the same to be 
kosher, or as having been prepared under and of a product or products sanctioned by the 
orthodox Hebrew religious requirements . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.”
106  Modified 
slightly in the 1920s, the statute survived nearly unchanged through the 1990s.
107  
Twenty-one other states have also enacted kosher fraud statutes.
108   
Kosher fraud statutes phrased like the above New York statute have been attacked 
in both state and federal court as violations of the Establishment Clause.
109  The difficulty 
is related to the definition of kosher as food conforming to Orthodox religious practices 
— in order to be enforced, the laws require the state government to refer to religious 
authorities and to take a position on points of religious doctrine when sects differed (as 
they do even within the bounds of Orthodox Judaism).  They also have the effect of 
promoting one religious sect over others by requiring consumers of kosher food to adhere 
to Orthodox custom, courts have found.
110  In response to the Commack Self-Service 
Kosher Meats decision, in which the Second Circuit declared New York’s kosher fraud 
statute to be in violation of the Establishment Clause, the state rewrote the law to 
emphasize labeling regulations and consumer education rather than religious 
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observance:
111 it required that any food sold as kosher be labeled appropriately and have 
its certifying agent registered with the state.  In addition, advertising for kosher products 
must identify the certifier in the advertisement itself.
112  The state registry has been placed 
on the website of the Department of Agriculture and Markets and can be searched by 
certifier, brand name, store, or food establishment.
113  New Jersey, which had a kosher 
fraud statute struck down by a state court,
114 now requires that dealers who represent food 
to be kosher “disclose the basis upon which that representation is made.”
115   
As mentioned above, private enforcement of kosher standards exists in 
conjunction with that of the state.  Certifiers will sue both to protect their own trademarks 
from unauthorized use and under the contracts that are signed as part of the certification 
procedure if they believe that their clients are not complying with the contract 
requirements.
116  Moreover, religious organizations not affiliated with any certifier spread 
news to the observant community of fraudulent or unauthorized kosher markings on 
particular products, as well as particular production lots of ordinarily kosher products that 
have been made non-kosher.  Kashrus Magazine, for example, provides “kosher alerts” 
both in its bimonthly publication and on its website.
117  The Kosher Supervision Guide, 
published by Yeshiva Birkas Reuven of Brooklyn, lists all known kosher-certifying 
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organizations, their symbols, and basic information about them, including the rabbinical 
authorities in charge and their specialties.
118  It notes, however, that individual consumers 
should check with their local rabbis or trusted agencies to determine the reliability and 
competency of any individual organization.
119   Because so many of the smaller certifying 
agents only certify local products, reputation within a particular community can be an 
effective method of both disseminating what standards a certifying agent has and 
ensuring that the certifier does not decrease those standards.   
 
Comparative Advantages of the Model Systems 
Although both organic and kosher certification systems strive to provide 
consumers with comprehensive, accurate, and appropriate information about the products 
and processes that affect their food composition, the systems are in key ways 
diametrically opposed.  The standards for organic certification are set almost entirely by 
the federal government with some limited state contribution, and private organizations 
are prohibited from requiring either more or less rigorous standards; in contrast, the 
government is actually barred by the Establishment Clause from setting any kosher 
certification standards and so private organizations must do so.  Although both systems 
rely on private certifiers for the task of evaluating and monitoring producers, the organic 
system requires those certifiers to meet an elaborate set of qualifications, while the kosher 
system prescribes at the most registration of very basic information with the state.   
The benefits of the federal standards-setting system are clear, as Congress noted 
in its initial enactment of the OFPA.  The system of state regulation during the early 
1990s was extremely difficult to navigate for any producer wishing to sell organic food 
across state lines; not only did each state have different standards for its own producers, 
but states would not permit out-of-state products that did not meet those standards.  
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Working on what was far from a blank slate, Congress succeeded in imposing an almost-
uniform set of standards on the organic industry, and the non-discrimination provisions of 
OFPA ensured that states could not hinder interstate commerce as they had previously 
done.   
In addition, as a result of the USDA certification process, consumers struggle less 
with various types of organic labeling.  The USDA organic seal provides a simple clue as 
to products that are almost entirely organic, and those with significant organic 
components can provide a standardized percentage characterization to indicate that.  
Although some consumer groups and scholars initially worried that shoppers would be 
confused by the multiple levels of organic classification,
120 studies have shown that, only 
a year after the implementation of NOP, 38% of consumers were aware of the USDA 
seal, and that consumers had an increased willingness to pay for larger quantities of 
organic content.
121  By 2006, 42% of “mid-level consumers,” those only somewhat 
involved with organic foods, specifically preferred products with the USDA seal to than 
those described with more generic labels like “natural.”
122  On the other hand, only 10% 
of consumers knew that products that bear the USDA seal must be at least 95% organic; 
27% thought that such products were entirely organic and a full 43% admitted that they 
were unaware of the seal’s meaning.
123  Understanding of the standards, unsurprisingly, 
decreased with the involvement level of the consumer in the organic world.
124    
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On the other hand, allowing the federal government to set what is basically the 
only standard for all organic food in the United States
125 has some significant downsides.  
The economic impact of any given regulatory change is felt nationwide, and the pressure 
to craft the standards to benefit the largest constituencies is therefore intense.  Because 
the standards can be changed by either Congress or the USDA, individual companies or 
lobbying organizations have multiple points on which to press for beneficial regulations 
or alterations to existing regulations.  As the controversies of the past seven years have 
shown, those impacts have indeed been felt.  The feed controversy sparked by 
Representative Deal is emblematic of the threat that legislators can pose to a carefully 
crafted program: the change was made at the last minute, to benefit a single company, 
and without consideration of the large-scale impact that it might have.  In addition, the 
nature of many of congressional bills allows amendments like this to be passed without 
necessarily garnering the support of a majority of the legislature; the feed amendment 
was placed in a massive, multi-pronged spending bill that congressmen might have 
supported in the whole despite disagreeing with the amendment (and judging by the 
repeal that quickly followed, such was the case).  On the other hand, regulatory capture of 
the USDA by the groups it regulates is perhaps a more insidious and relevant concern.  
Although the Harvey case is so far the only one in which the courts have been involved, 
consumer groups and associations of some of the more traditional organic organizations 
continue to argue that standards should be toughened in order to accord with Congress’s 
dictates.  As Harvey shows, however, the agency is not particularly interested in 
responding to those concern — and when the courts are included, Congress appears 
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happy to come to the USDA’s defense.  Moreover, appointees to the National Organic 
Standards Board, the USDA’s independent advisory committee, have in recent years been 
individuals who, while they technically filled the professional requirements for their 
seats, had significant ties to large industry players.
126     
Even when there is no legislative or agency political maneuvering going on, the 
bureaucratization of the standard-setting process nonetheless poses issues for many 
consumers.  For those with deep involvement in the alternative food production world, 
the organic standards outlined by OFPA nearly two decades ago simply do not reflect 
many of the production requirements that they would prefer to see.  With the rise of the 
local food movement, for example, consumers are choosing to value a decrease in “food 
miles” — distance traveled from farm or pasture to plate — over a decrease in pesticide 
residue.  Indeed, small local farmers, the very individuals that shoppers often associate 
with organic foods, may be particularly unable to meet the extra expenses and difficulties 
associated with strict organic production as federally defined.   Moreover, producers who 
hold themselves to higher standards and have organic production that far exceeds the 
USDA’s requirements have no way of distinguishing themselves in the marketplace for 
the segment of dedicated, core consumers.  Some scholars have suggested standardizing 
and regulating other process-based labeling claims like “natural” or “free-range” in order 
to meet these concerns,
127 but such actions are inevitably lengthy (as suggested by the 
fifteen year path from statute to implemented regulations for organic) and may result in 
the same problems with watered-down standards.   
The great benefit to the kosher system of private standards setting, on the other 
hand, is that it can easily encompass the variety of practices desired in kosher products by 
consumers both observant and non-observant.  Although some combination of tradition, 
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kosher fraud statutes, and marketplace demand has settled the general standard of kosher 
certification at that demanded by Orthodox traditions,
128 those who are particularly 
observant or demanding can choose to purchase food certified only by agents who uphold 
higher, optional traditions.  Those who belong to denominations with looser restrictions, 
on the other hand, can find items like sturgeon certified by Conservative organizations, 
and thereby still be assured that no non-kosher contaminants have been present in its 
preparation.  Moreover, kosher certification agents can and have required as a condition 
of certification that manufacturers conduct themselves in ways that are congruent with 
Jewish values, even if the conduct at issue, like Sabbath observance or the content of an 
accompanying comic, is unrelated to the kosher status of the product.
129   
The downside of all of this choice, naturally, is the difficulty for consumers of 
appropriately evaluating the kosher certification on any given product.  The symbol 
carried by the product, particularly if it is one of a smaller or local certifier, may be 
unfamiliar to the shopper.  Although products like the Kosher Supervision Guide are 
available for some level of guidance, only those who observe the laws of kashrut for 
religious reasons — a small percentage of the overall purchasers of kosher products — 
are likely to have or even to be aware of such manuals. In addition, disclosure of exactly 
which standards each organization follows can be difficult to find.  The Kosher 
Supervision Guide is mostly a directory of kosher certifiers; it contains no reliability 
information and notes that “[y]ou must ask your rabbi which agencies to rely upon.”
130  
Because kosher certification is carried out via private, case-by-case contract 
arrangements between the certifier and manufacturer, even a customer familiar with the 
certifier cannot ensure that particular techniques have been mandated on a given product.  
Moreover, any particular certifier is only as stringent as the given inspector charged with 
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oversight of a manufacturer.  In essence, then, a consumer who chooses a product based 
on the certifier is relying mostly on the certifier’s community reputation and voluntary 
pronouncements.  This is an easier process for observant Jews than for other types of 
kosher consumers, who may not have rabbis to consult or other types of community 
resources available to them, but nonetheless find it important for various reasons that 
kashrut be strictly observed.
131     
Enforcement issues, too, are a regular item of concern for both certification 
systems.  As discussed above, the kosher system combines private trademark protection 
and contract enforcement with, in nearly half of the states, public fraud protection and 
disclosure requirements.  This “belt and suspenders” approach allows the regulators to 
work hand in hand with industry players to ensure that kosher standards are protected.  In 
fact, many certifiers will refer potential cases of fraud to state investigators.
132  In the 
organic system, on the other hand, NOP maintains sole responsibility for enforcement 
except in the few states where additional regulations have been instituted.  Given 
resource constraints — NOP has fewer than ten staffers — and concerns about agency 
capture by regulated industries, many argue that NOP is significantly underenforcing 
many organic regulations.
133   
                                                 
131 American Muslims, for example, are frequent consumers of kosher food because they 
have their own religious standards for meat products, and products certified as kosher 
dairy or parve (neutral) are guaranteed not to contain meat.  Those with dairy allergies 
may choose to purchase kosher products for similar reasons.   
132 Gutman, supra note 28, at 2378–79.   
133 Paula Lavigne, USDA Does Not Always Enforce Organic Label Standards, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, July 25, 2006, available at http://listproc.ucdavis.edu/archives/ 
organicfarm/log0607/0004.html; Press Release, Mark Kastel, Cornucopia Institute, 
Message to Obama: Please Fix the USDA’s Organic Mess (Feb. 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS204725+24-Feb-2009+PRN20090224.    
One of the most pressing enforcement concerns for organic advocates is the large number 
of organic products currently being made with ingredients from China.  Although these 
ingredients are allegedly organic, the USDA has very little direct oversight in China to 
ensure that this is the case.  The agency made its first enforcement visit to China in 2008, 
and the country still has no certifying agents directly accredited by the USDA.  See 
National Organic Program, USDA-Accredited Certifying Agents, http://www.ams.usda. 
gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateJ&navID=ListofCertifiers
NOPNationalOrganicProgramHome&rightNav1=ListofCertifiersNOPNationalOrganicPr  27 
 
Certification Regimes in the Future 
Before the institution of the federal organic regulations, at least one scholar called 
for the organic certification system to be run along the same lines as the kosher 
certification system: private standards with limited government fraud enforcement and 
disclosure provisions.
134  This would likely have been a difficult task; one of the reasons 
that private standard-setting works so well in the kosher setting is that states are legally 
barred from substantively regulating based on religious standards.
135  Before the federal 
regulations, in contrast, states had taken an active role in setting standards for all organic 
products marketed in their territories, hindering expansion of the organic industry and 
perhaps unduly privileging single-state producers.  With this type of regulatory regime 
already in place, federal legislation seemed the natural solution to institute uniformity and 
standardization.   
Nonetheless, it seems plausible that the organic regime might still be tweaked to 
address some of the problems that have come up since the implementation of federal 
regulations and to take advantage of some of the features of the kosher model.  For 
instance, the USDA could reconsider its ban on additional requirements by private 
certifiers.  This would permit some of the market differentiation sought by more 
dedicated organic consumers, while still maintaining a federally mandated baseline to 
ensure quality for consumers who have neither the resources nor the inclination to 
educate themselves in the niceties of organic techniques.  This change, however, would 
be unlikely to affect enforcement issues; companies not in compliance with federal 
                                                                                                                                                
ogramHome&topNav=&leftNav=NationalOrganicProgram&page=NOPACAs&resultTy
pe=&acct=nopgeninfo (last visited May 13, 2009).   
134 Gutman, supra note 28, at 2832.   
135 Even before courts began to strike down kosher fraud laws due to constitutional 
concerns, states did not require more in their statutes than that products be “sanctioned by 
the Code of Jewish Laws, namely in the Shulcan Aruch” or be “prepared or processed in 
accordance with orthodox Hebrew religious requirements by a recognized orthodox 
rabbinical council.”  Berman, supra note 106, at 19 (quoting MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW. 
§ 14-901 (West 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.297e (1991)).       28 
organic regulations would be more likely to mislabel using the USDA seal than a private 
trademark not recognized by the mass market.  On that front, Congress may choose to 
consider making states joint partners in organic enforcement in the hope of increasing 
resources and local commitment to these standards.
136    
There are an enormous number of labeling claims related to food processing and 
manufacture that currently have no federal regulation: hormone-free, local, free-range, 
and natural, just to name a few.  Rather than proceeding directly to the conclusion that 
setting federal standards would be the best manner of handling these claims, 
policymakers might want to consider something more along the lines of the hybrid model 
suggested above, or even simply a version of the kosher model.  Many of the concerns 
about implementing the kosher model on a wider scale revolve around consumer 
confusion and standard devaluation — if any private organization can “certify” a product 
as free-range when it passes a standard far below what consumers might expect that label 
to mean, and consumers are uneducated about which certifications are meaningful, then 
the certification system is essentially useless.  The kosher model is thought to work as 
effectively as it does because of the tight-knit observant community; certifiers who do not 
meet the basic communal expectations lose the most dedicated portion of their consumer 
base.   
Consumers interested in other types of process-based labeling like organics, 
however, may not be as disorganized as often believed.  A boycott led by the Organic 
Consumers Association of organic milk produced by factory farms had a significant 
impact; major organic retailers dropped the questionable products and stock prices fell for 
                                                 
136 Of course, it is unclear how well-enforced regulations are in the states that already 
bear the responsibility for that enforcement.  See, e.g., Phil Wayne, Spotty Oversight of 
Organic Foods May Prove Toxic, The Lookout News, Feb. 8, 2005, available at 
http://www.surfsantamonica.com/ssm_site/the_lookout/news/News-2005/Feb-
2005/02_08_08_05--Spotty_Oversight_of_Organic_Foods_May_Prove_Toxic.htm 
(noting that the California Department of Food and Agriculture planned to perform only 
twelve “spot checks” of organic produce at farm stands and grocery stores in Los Angeles 
County during the 2004–05 fiscal year and that records statutorily required to be 
available to the public were not).     29 
the corporate owners.
137  Given that the market for products with niche label claims like 
free-range is smaller (and likely more homogenous in values) than that of the organic 
market at large, purveyors of those products may not be able to afford to alienate their 
core consumer base.  These niche, animal husbandry–related claims may also be more 
controllable by kosher-fraud-type enforcement mechanisms because standardizing 
meaning is less difficult; “hormone-free” is a factual claim that is either true or false.  On 
the other hand, label claims like “natural” or “pure,” which have very little inherent 
content, might be better served by federal regulation.  Because no one set of consumer or 
activist groups would have values particularly closely aligned with these terms, 
community enforcement becomes more difficult.
138   
 
Conclusion 
  Process-based labeling will continue to raise issues of accuracy, informativeness, 
and intelligibility for consumers, and the problem is only likely to increase as shoppers 
raise their awareness about food production methodologies.  The coexistence of the 
organic and kosher certification models indicates that the public and private systems can 
have very different reactions to the same set of concerns.  As is clear from the models’ 
common use of third-party certifiers, no one organization can authenticate a nationwide 
swath of food production.  However, policymakers can choose from systems ranging 
between highly centralized certification systems, like that for organic food, and highly 
decentralized ones, like that for kosher.  In order to come to the most appropriate choice, 
the values of consumer accessibility and choice, standardization, and enforceability must 
                                                 
137 Green, supra note 67, at 825.  Nonetheless, the boycott continues on to this day, and 
the products have not been removed from the market.  See CCOF, supra note 72.   
138 “Local” is an interesting label claim under this analysis; it has very little inherent 
content but a small base of consumers who are interested in the marking.  It is possible 
that the local claim would be best served by state regulation (ideally with cooperation 
between some neighboring states); such regulation would provide content but allow for 
localized standard setting and enforcement.  Since the entire concept of local food is that 
it not travel far from producer to consumer, interstate commerce concerns are less 
pressing than they might be for other labeling claims.     30 
be carefully weighed.  In the end, it may turn out that a policy system taking elements 
from both known models produces the best results for consumers, producers, and 
regulators.   